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Editorial:
Dear Politician
Venerated Citizen
Letters
to Readers
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Oct. 15, 2005 Issue
Religion & State
The Ramadan Ordinance in Pakistan
by Saad Anis
In 1981, the Ehtaram-e-Ramadan (Respect for Ramadan) Ordinance (No. XXIII)
was issued by President Ziaul Haq, whereby eating, drinking and smoking in
public during fasting hours in the month of Ramadan was declared unlawful.
Contravention of the ordinance was made punishable for up to three months,
with a possible fine of Rs 500.
Notwithstanding the political points scored by the Zia regime with its promulgation,
many still support this law and present a number of arguments in its favour.
The most common one posed is that the ordinance is imperative for the maintenance
of the sanctity of the holy month. Advocates of the law also claim that the
sight of people not fasting and publicly indulging their appetites might wound
Muslim sentiments. Lastly, pragmatic commentators hold that the ordinance
really doesn't pose a discomfort to minorities, as they are free to eat and
drink within the privacy of their homes. If the law is not causing a tangible
suppression of any minority community, they argue, what harm is there in keeping
it, if only for the cosmetic purpose of appeasing the majority?
At the outset, it is important that we determine the need for proscriptive
laws in a society. Normally, the reason behind the promulgation of any law
is rooted in need. Prohibitive laws are formulated to ensure prevention when
a practice is deemed detrimental to social stability and harmony, and a need
is felt to eradicate it. The system of crime and punishment is essentially
a code of conduct,
laid down for the populace by the legislature.
The first argument in favour of the Ramadan Ordinance is ingenious on account
of its mass appeal. It wins converts by drawing on the sense of religious
fervour of the State's Muslim majority, and the
disposition to decency of its non-Muslim minority. Indeed, our people, with
a predilection for arguing ad hominem, would immediately accuse any Muslim
opposing such an evidently natural law of flagrant heresy, and a non-Muslim
voicing dissent of deliberate irreverence to Islam.
Nonetheless, the assertion that a ban on the public consumption of food
and drink needs to be placed to ensure the sanctity of Ramadan is specious
at best. It implicitly renders the sanctity of Ramadan subservient to individual
caprice. It presumes that the holiness of the month per se is insufficient
and requires ostentation in the form of repressive State legislation for vindication.
Moreover, the law is proscriptive and, by definition, imposed to quell a
practice deemed against societal or national interest. By the fact of its
enforcement, the law presumes that non-Muslim minorities have a general propensity
to eat and drink in public for the mere purpose of exhibiting their gross
disrespect of the holy month. Such an assumption has no basis in fact. Further,
the law seeks to quell plurality and impose a quite unnecessary uniformity,
which has disadvantages that we will highlight presently.
The second argument that people eating, drinking and smoking publicly during
Ramadan would hurt Muslim sentiments is equally unsound. If we concede to
the notion of respect for all religions
within the State, as the constitution implies in Article 20, fairness subsequently
demands a similar prohibition on public consumption of food and drink during
Lent to show due deference for the faith of our 3.75 million Catholic countrymen.
If, however, laws are promulgated under the axiom of the hegemony of the majority
without regard to the personal freedom of the minority, as is the increasing
propensity of most proclaimed modern democracies, the ensuing logical consequences
of such a legislative policy would be chilling for the minority within the
State. Any number of actions, normally considered part of an individual's
personal life, could become distasteful to the whimsical majority, which
could demand the suppression of the minority's freedoms under the pretext
of a real or illusive offence to its own sense of propriety.
If the above argument is carried forth logically, it becomes possible for
the majority in theory to have, say, the Catholic mass prohibited by law simply
because it views the ritual as a contravention of its
own sense of righteousness. While such a hypothesis sounds preposterous,
this particular example has intentionally been chosen, as similar instances
have lamentably transpired in our history. Those
interested further may examine the constitutional amendments of 1974.
The most convincing argument in favour of this law is the last. That is,
even if one admits that the law is pointless, so long as it does not pose
any serious discomfort to the non-Muslim minority, what is
the objective of repealing it? Indeed, would it not be prudent to keep the
law intact and not risk unnecessary controversy and political propaganda by
Islamic parties, which a move to shelve it
might incur?
For this, we need to digress from our current discourse to examine the constitution
of the State. Article 41(2) of the constitution states that the president
of Pakistan must be Muslim. While no such
requirement exists for the office of the prime minister, any conscientious
non-Muslim would be loath to take the oath set for the premier-elect as prescribed
in the third schedule, as it is rife with
protestations of Islamic belief.
When one protests such discriminatory laws which render it impossible for
a non-Muslim to ever assume the highest offices of the State, the argument
rendered in defence is that it is well nigh impossible for a member of the
minority community to ever garner the public support or political clout to
compete for the post in any case. Indeed, the chances of that are as bright
as those of our living to see a black president elected in the United States.
However, such laws are harmful to the country's integrity because they blatantly
degrade the minorities to second-rate citizenry by implying that only Muslims
are sufficiently patriotic, or suitable, for the highest office of the State
by mere virtue of their religion. The damage that it does is in the form of
a strident reminder to minorities that they are indeed few in number, living
in a State
which sees them as outsiders and with a majority that can never regard them
as equals. The abrogation of these laws may not have any imminent practical
value, but their mere presence in the constitution suffocates the minorities'
hope for an equal status.
In a similar manner, the culinary ban during Ramadan, while not a source
of physical discomfort, is tangibly painful in that it serves to alienate
the religious minority by placing unnecessary restrictions on it. Such a restriction,
like the ones above, strikes at the heart of the minorities' sense of nationalism
with the imposition of a pernicious uniformity. In the end, the loser is
none other than the State itself.
For a country that vows to treat people of all creeds and religions as equal
citizens, ours is, unfortunately,
falling well short.
About the
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