South Asia




Why the UN Resolution on Kashmir Won't Work

by Saad Anis




The ice continues to thaw, as relations between Pakistan and India improve, with 
the progression of multi-level talks between the two governments. The parleys have 
covered a variety of issues ranging from trade and immigration, to prisoner exchange 
and the long-standing Siachen issue. This leads one to believe, that in time, the two 
sides will come around to resolving the Kashmir dispute, which is arguably the bone 
of contention between Pakistan and India.


Having said that, one cannot help but observe that the settlement of the Kashmir 
issue in accord with the UN Resolutions is no longer possible. This is due to two 
reasons. First, the UN resolutions explicitly demand a complete withdrawal 
of Pakistani forces from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (also called Azad or Free
Kashmir), followed by an Indian withdrawal, as a precondition to a plebiscite. 
According to the resolutions, India would be allowed to maintain a minimum 
patrolling force necessary for the maintenance of law and order within the state. 
Needless to say, Pakistan is unlikely to ever accept a situation, whereby it has to 
part with such a large territory, even if it is for the facilitation of the long-cherished 
plebiscite. One, thus, fails to understand Pakistan's consistent obsession with the 
UN resolutions.




No Allowance for Independence


Moreover, even if we suppose that this precondition is fulfilled and the withdrawal 
of forces is secured, the plebiscite as envisioned by the UN resolution is obsolete 
in its formulation, in that, it only lists Pakistan or India as possible options for the 
Kashmiri populace. That is to say, the plebiscite does not entail independence as 
a possible option for Kashmir. As much as Pakistan and India would hate to 
acknowledge, the fact is that a vocal new opinion has emerged on the Kashmiri 
political landscape in the last half century, one of independence. The UN resolutions 
disregard the existence of this eloquently voiced and widely supported notion. 
They are out of keeping with the times, and thus, impractical.




Playing the Public


Added to the already complex equation is the intricacy of the sanctimonious 
propaganda fed to the Indian and Pakistani public by their respective governments. 
Ironically, a majority of the people on either side today believes that its respective 
government's stance on Kashmir is principled, while the occupation of Kashmiri 
territory by the other side is illegal. By virtue of this governmental policy of presenting 
the convenient side of the picture, people in both nations assert that the entire state 
should rightfully be handed over to them. Furthermore, jingoistic slogans of Kashmir 
Banega Pakistan (Kashmir will become part of Pakistan) and Atoot Ang (Kashmir 
as an unbreakable part of India) raised by the two governments for over 50 years, 
have stubbornly implanted in the minds of the peoples of both countries, the idea 
that Kashmiris want to join them. Were there to be a plebiscite, the public on either 
believes, the Kashmiris would overwhelmingly vote for them.


With the realities on ground hinting strongly at a popular desire for independence, 
it is unlikely that the populace of either country would settle for anything less than 
the whole of Kashmir. Both the governments have dug their own proverbial grave by 
inculcating such mass intransigence, with their half-truths coming to bite them 
where it hurts.




The Simla Accord


Also incomprehensible is Pakistan's annoying persistence in raising the Kashmir 
issue at every multilateral forum. The Simla Accord signed by both countries in 
1972 clearly identifies Kashmir as a bilateral issue to be settled by the two parties 
independent of external intrusion. Despite being a signatory to it, Pakistan has 
been relentless in bringing it up on every forum, from the important (SAARC Foreign 
Ministers' Conference, 2004) to the mundane (The World Cultural and Sports 
Conference, 2004). Such a flagrant breach of an agreement raises question marks 
over the State's credibility, and needlessly serves to pique India at this sensitive 
juncture.


Having said that, India is also guilty of procrastinating on the issue and making 
contradictory statements, which can only be construed as Machiavellian 
manipulation. The Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh described the attitude 
of the Pakistani leadership as "constructive and positive" after his meeting with 
President Musharraf on July 24, 2004 in Islamabad. However, he adopted a 
completely different tone upon landing home, stating the very nextday that he 
was unhappy and in fact "disappointed" with Pakistan's suggestion of a reasonable 
time-frame on Kashmir. Such deliberate inconsistency in attitude will serve no 
constructive purpose in removing distrust between the two countries.




The Kashmiri Population 


Even comprehensive dialogue on Kashmir, once initiated, presents multiple 
dilemmas. For instance, if a plebiscite with the added option of independence 
were approbated as the solution to the issue, its implementation would raise 
problems. Kashmir is an ethnically diverse state comprising three main parts: 
the Valley (95 percent Muslims), Jammu (60 percent Hindus) and Ladakh (50 
percent Buddhists). A plebiscite in Kashmir would invariably leave a large minority 
disgruntled, regardless of the outcome. Furthermore, supposing that a plebiscite 
is held and the majority votes for independence, granting freedom to Kashmir would 
provide the impetus to many dormant separatist movements in both India and 
Pakistan. Tamil Nadu and Punjab in India, and NWFP and Balochistan in 
Pakistan are some of the troubled areas which could experience a surge in 
nationalistic demands if such a solution to Kashmir was ever employed. The 
extreme result would be a nightmarish "Balkanisation" of the subcontinent.


A viable solution to the issue would be to facilitate a plebiscite restricted to the 
Valley, where the demand for independence is the strongest and in its most 
violent manifestation. The populace of the rest of the disputed territory has not 
displayed any potent desire for freedom, and seems content with the present 
situation. This would allow Pakistan and India to maintain control of the Northern 
Areas and Ladakh respectively. However, an independent Valley would still be 
economically dependent on India and Pakistan, as it is a land-locked region.


Let us hope that the issue can be settled, so that lasting peace becomes a reality.

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